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IN THE: SUPRE:ME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
i !ll t

(Jf

llTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent.

-vJOHN

Case No. 19058

IRWIN MOON,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with Aggravated Robbery, a
first-degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann,,
(1978)

76-6-302

for the robbery of Smith's Food King in Payson, Utah,

on December 18, 1982.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried with his co-defendant before a
Jury on February 9 and 14, 1983, the Honorable J. Robert
Bullock, presiding.

The jury found appellant guilty of

Aggravated Robbery on February 14, 1983.
made a motion for mistrial based on juror
misconduct and prejudice.

The motion was denied.

Appellant

also moved for Judgment N.O.V. based on insufficient evidence.
111

is

mot ion was also denied.
The trial court imposed sentence on February 14,
rlf

arlrlit

an indeterminate term of five years to life and an

ional term of one year to run consecutively for use of a

firearm in commission of the crime.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the guilty verdict in
the court below.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 18, 1982 around 7 :00 p.m.,

four men

robbed the smith's Food King in Payson, Utah (R. 154-156,
217-219, 255-258).

Three of the men were tall and slender; in

the six foot range, the fourth was about five feet seven
inches in height (R. 169, 179).

One of the men grabbed the

store manager, threatened him with a knife and forced him to
open the safe ( R.

156, 158).

Another of the men stood by the

entrance to the store holding a double barrell bolt-action
sawed-off shotgun and yelling for the others to hurry (R. 219,
222,

260).

He wore a brown corduroy coat with a hood, levis

and a Halloween mask that resembled an elderly man with a big
nose and white hair (R. 1915, 219, 243).
just towered"

He "seemed like he

(R. 202).

The other three men wore ski masks (R. 223).
the masks had an orange stripe around it ( R. 223).

one of

Two of

them wore blue ski-type parkas and another wore a green army
fatigue coat (R. 223, 226).

At least one of the men wore

brown cotton gloves (R. 196, 198, 201).
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One nf them emptied the cash register while the safe
,.''" he1ng opened
'";'"i

(R.

223).

He was carrying a crowbar which he

to strike one of the cashiers whr:> had trouble opening her
He jammed the money into the pockets

,,f

his hlue ski-parka and possibly into a bag

241, 24 3,

258,

which he used
to hurry

264).

(R.

209, 223,

The third man also carried a crowbar

to threaten a customer to encourage the manager

in opening the safe ( R.

200).

Joe Hanna, the store manager, testified that all but
tree man with the knife were in the six foot
to ii'2"

range;

from 5'11"

(R.

182).

He also stated that he was 5'7" tall

himself (R.

179).

Another witness testified that the only man

who was short was the one who grabbed Joe whom she estimated
was a head taller than Joe (R.

208, 212).

A third witness

stated that the two men by the safe were quite a bit taller
than Joe (R.

233).

Finally, Joe said that the man wearing the

!Jlue ski parka and taking the money from the tills was fi feet
or more (R.

159, 243,

258).

After gathering approximately S2,500-S3,000 from the
cash registers and $1,200 from the safe, the men ran out of
the store anrl got

plates (R.
Int

an.1 up the

l>1Jtl•iifl<J where
""l'l' les

, cd

.rPrj

(R.

into an orange Ford pick-up truck without
167).

street

They drove out of the store parking

to a parking area outsirle an apartment

they parked the truck and got into two other

2R4,

298).

one of these was an old red or purple

Chevy anrl the other was an old, white Chevy Impala
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(R. 298).

Both cars drove north on Highway 91

(R. 298-299),

At about 7:39 p.m. Brent Shelby, a Highway
Patrolman, saw a car matching the description of the maroon '"
purple car in the northbound lane of the freeway which he
pulled over (R. 329-331, 333).
(R. 335).

There were two men in the car

The driver was appellant, John Moon (R. 335).

Inside the car were a brown ski mask with orange on it, a
metal pry bar, a blue ski-type parka, a rubber Halloween mask
with an old face and white hair, a sawed-off shotgun, a gold
or brown corduroy coat, a light-colored corduroy coat with
blue stripes and two pairs of brown gloves (R. 337-346).

In

the pocket of the blue ski parka was a large amount of money $1,102.50 -

approximately two fistsfull -

in different

denominations plus a roll of quarters (R. 339, 344, 367).

All

of the items except the light-colored corduroy coat and the
cash were identified by witnesses as being or looking like the
clothing and weapons used in the robbery (R. 162-163, 188,
196, 197, 200-202, 215, 220, 222, 224-226, 241, 257, 258).
The red or purple car was identified as the one seen leaving
the apartment building after the robbery (R. 298, 368).
Before all of the State's evidence was introduced,
appellant's co-defendant, David Shepherd, changed his plea to
guilty CR. 320).

Later, Mr. Shepherd took the stand in

appellant's behalf (R. 393).

Shepherd testified that he was

the robber who held the gun, the appellant was not one of the
robbers and that his three accomplices were named Benjamin,

-4-

eranclt and Joe (R.

394,

398, 399, 400).

5heµherd, after the robbery,
t.•

According to

he and Benjamin drove back roads

Springville taking about 10-15 minutes to return

aµµellant's car to him (R. 400, 403, 424, 426).

Shepherd said

he never met appellant until after the robbery, when appellant
gave Shepherd a ride in the car that Shepherd and Benjamin
returned to appellant

(R. 400).

Shepherd was unable to

provide the last names of any of his accomplices stating that
he knew only Benjamin and Brandt prior to the robbery ( R.
39 8 '

39 9 '

395,

4 08 ) •

Appellant testified that Benjamin asked to borrow
appellant's car to hold up a drug dealer who "burned" him (R.
45R).

He said he never knew Benjamin and never saw him, but

that he left the car for him in a parking lot because Benjamin
•as a friend of a friend
picked up his car,
with him (R.

461).

(R,

457, 458, 459).

When appellant

he said Shepherd was sitting in it and rode
Appellant stated he was travelling to Orem

at a normal rate of speed when the police stopped him (R. 462,
472).

Shepherd never mentioned the robbery to him and

appellant didn't look at the items that were found in the car
Appellant was supposed to receive some money or

IR. 4fi 2) ,

some "pot" for the use of his car (R. 458) but did not know
hnw much (R.
lnf'hes tall

467).

Appellant also stated that he is 6 feet 3

(R. 463).

A criminalist from the Weber State Crime Lab
examined several items for hair matching that of appellant

-5-

(R. 441, 443).

He found no hair on any item that appearec1

be from appellant (R. 446).

tri

He testified that it was µossitdc

for a person to come into contact with something and shed n<>
hairs on it (R. 449) and that a ski mask worn for five,

teri,

or fifteen minutes might not retain hair from the wearer
452).

(R,

Hair found on the brown corduroy coat and the brown anc

orange ski mask was similar to Shepherd's hair (R. 446).
In rebuttal, Kirk Mittelman, a police officer,
testified that he travelled the most expeditious route from
the offramp, where appellant was stopped, to Springville and
then to the apartment building in Payson stopping at the
Smith's Food King (R. 479-480).

The officer travelled at

normal rates of speed; 60 mph on the freeway and between 30-40
mph through Payson and Springville (R.

481).

allowed for any stops along the route (R.

No time was

479).

The travel

time was 26 minutes (R. 485).
Mittelman also drove from Smith's to the apartment
building and then on the freeway to the point where appellant
was arrested (R.

486).

No time was allowed for stop overs anj

a normal rate of speed was observed (R. 486-487).

The total

travel time for this route was 18 minutes 30 seconds ( R. 487).

-6-

ARGUMENT
POINT
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S
CONVICTION.
Appellant claims that the evidEnce presented at
Ltial was insufficient to support his conviction for
Aygravated Robbery.

In cons ide ring a ch al le nge to the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, this
Court has always applied the following standard of review.
We reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence only when the
evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict is
sufficientl · inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt •
State v. Bingham, Utah, No. 18774, slip op. at 4 (June 13,
1984) State v. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443 (1983).
Kerekes, Utah,

In State v.

622 P.2d 1161 (1980), the court also stated:

It is the defendant's burden to establish
that the evidence was so inconclusive or
insubstantial that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime charged.
Id. at 1168, emphasis added.

In addition, this Court

reaffirmed its deference to conclusions reached by the jury in
matters solely within its province:

-7-

It is the exclusive function of the jury
to weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses, and it is
not within the prerogative of the Court to
substitute its judgment for that of the
fact-finder.
State v. Jolley, Utah No. 18559, slip op. at 2 (July 6, lg8;1
quoting State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231

(1980).

Appellant has not met his burden of establishing
that the evidence against him was so inconclusive or
insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

He argues that, because the

evidence was circumstantial and he offered an explanation of
the fact that he was arrested while driving one of the cars
used to escape from the robbery, the jury was required to
believe his exculpatory evidence, which the state did not
directly controvert.

He further argues that none of the

witnesses could identify him nor did they guess his exact
height.

Therefore,

he urges this court to overturn the jury's

verdict.
That the evidence was circumstantial is not alone
sufficient grounds for reversal.

The evidence must also be

sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds could not have found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Petree, 659 P.2d at 443.

The evidence in

this case supports the jury's verdict and shows that appellant
along with David Shepherd and two others robbed the Smith's
Food King on December 18, 1982.
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Witnesses said that three of the robbers were tall
and slender-built (R. 169) and the shorter man was over 5 feet
7 inches, possibly a "head" taller than that (R. 179, 208,
c])J

one of the taller men, wearing a blue ski parka and
cot ton gloves, removed the money from the cash registers

ancl stuffed it into his pocket (R. 196, 223, 243,

258).

Three

of the men wore ski masks and the fourth wore a Halloween mask
(R. 196, 223).

One man held a sawed-off shotgun and another

carried a tire iron or crowbar (R.

222, 240).

Appellant was discovered drivinq one of the cars
used to escape from the scene of the robbery ( R.

298, 335)

within 30-40 minutes of the time that the robbery began (R.

155, 330) and within 24 minutes of the time the robbery was
first reported to the police (R. 327).

Inside the car were

numerous items identified by witnesses as clothing and weapons
used by the robbers (R. 337-346, 162-163, 188, 196, 197,
200-202, 215, 220, 222, 224-225, 226, 241, 257, 258).

One of

these items was a blue ski parka with $1,102.50 in a pocket
(R. 339, 344, 367).

Also among these items were a crowbar, a

sawed-off shotgun, a ski mask, a Halloween mask and brown
cot ton gloves

( R.

337-346).

Appellant and his co-defendant, David Shepherd,
explained that these items were placed into the car by
Shen erd and a person named Benjamin who borrowed the car from
'l'[>ellant

(R.

400,

458).

Appellant claimed he did not know

"w"J1niin or see him but that he lent Benjamin the car because

-9-

he was a friend of a friend

(R. 457-459).

He further said

that Benjamin had the car for about 30 minutes (R. 460) and
that it was returned to him at about 7:10-7:15 p.m.
472).

(R.

460,

Appellant also claimed he did not see any of the items

that were found in the car although he was sitting on the blue
ski parka (R. 343, 462, 464).
Appellant argues that the jury was required to
believe his testimony and that of Shepherd which exculpated
appellant.

The jury is not required to believe exculpatory

evidence presented by the defense, but may choose to discount
it completely.

State v. Garlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761, 762

(1979); State v. Howell, Utah, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (1982).
Appellant emphasizes that to warrant conviction,
circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable
hypothesis except guilt.

The evidence adduced need not,

however, exclude everv hvpothesis, "however unsubstantial or
incredible, which a party to such a controversy may dream up."
State v. Tanner, Utah, 675 P.2d 539, 550 (1983);
v. John, Utah, 586 P.2d 410 (1978).

Furthermore, the jury has

the exclusive function to weigh all of the evidence and
determine the credibility of witnesses.
18559, slip op. at 2.

State v. Jolley, No.

The jury was free, therefore, to

conclude that the story presented by the defense was
unbelievable.
Appellant's explanation of the events of December
18, 1982 is simply not believable.
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It is unlikely that there

sufficient

time for appellant's car to be returned to him

arid then driven back out onto the freeway between the time
rh;it

the robbery was reported and the time that appellant was
The total driving time between these two points is

''.t"['lw,-J.

appruximately 26 minutes allowing no time for stop-overs and
driving at a normal rate of speed (R. 479, 481, 485) which
appellant and Shepherd both testified was the rate at which
the car was driven (R. 431, 472).

Even if the robbery ended

at 7:15 p.m. when it was first reported to the police, only 24
minutes had elapsed when appellant was seen driving along the
freeway at 7:39 p.m.
The better explanation is that appellant
part ic ipa tecl

in the robbery and that a short time was taken

after the robbery in the apartments'
money.

parking area dividing the

That would al low sufficient time for the 18 1/2 minute

drive at a normal pace from the robbery to the offramp where
appellant was stopped (R.

48f>-487).

Appellant also asserts that the fact none of the
witnesses was able +-o accurately estimate his exact height
further supports his version of the facts.

However, most of

the witnesses, although there was some conflicting testimony,
agreed that three of the four robbers were tall and at least
i,-, the 6-foot
sfi mask,
were- founcl
.Jt

more

range.

The man wearing the dark blue ski parka,

brown gloves and carrying a crowbar (all of which
in appellant's car) was described as being 6 feet

in height (R. 159, 243,

258).
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Appellant said he is 6

feet 3 inches ( R.

463).

Furthermore, it is not reasonable to believe that
appellant would lend his car to a person he did not kno1o1 and
never saw in exchange for an unspecified amount of money or
drugs for use in a hold-up of a drug dealer.

Nor is it

reasonable that appellant would re-enter his car after it was
used for such a purpose and not not ice the

items left behind

by the borrower, es-ecially a coat that he was sitting on or
even a Halloween mask on the seat between appellant and his
passenger ( R. 341, 343 ,344).
Finally, appellant urges that none of the items
found in the car held either his fingerprints or strands of
his hair.

This he claims is conclusive evidence that he did

not participate in the robbery.

To the contrary, however, if

appellant was the tall man in the blue ski jacket and bro1o1n
gloves, his fingerprints would not appear on the crowbar
because the gloves would have prevented their transfer,
Furthermore, appellant's own expert witness testified that a
ski mask could be worn for up to 15 minutes without the wearer
shedding even one hair on it (R. 452).

Thus, the fact that

none of appellant's hair was found on any of the items is not
conclusive proof that those items were never worn by
appellant.
From this evidence the jury could conclude that
appellant was guilty beyond a reasonble doubt.

The evidence

was not sufficiently inconclusive or so inherently improbable
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1 hot

reasonble minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt.

PPtrP_e_, 659 P.2d at 443.

The jury verdict should, therefore,

be affirmed.

POINT I I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL.
After the jury retired to deliberate their verdict
in this case appellant moved for a mistrial based on juror
prejudice (R.

524).

The motion was grounded on an alleged

statement made by one juror to another juror that was
overheard by Craig Snyder, an attorney who was observing the
trial.

The statement was allegedly made during a recess that

occurred prior to the testimony of the last two or three
witnesses but after defendant Shepherd changed his plea to
guilty and testified in appellant's behalf (R. 525).

There

was no evidence that the statement was heard by more than the
two jurors observed by Mr. Snyder.

Nor did Mr. Snyder testify

as to the identity of the jurors or the exact words used.

The

statement was offered by defense counsel to the court as
follows:

"Well, we only have to hear one more confession and

then we are through."

( R.

524).

on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court
er1-,..,1

in denying his motion for a mistrial because the

stdtement showed that the juror had determined appellant's
1

he fore

hearing al 1 of the evidence.
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Refusal to grant

the mistrial, he asserts, requires reversal of his conviction.

In the context of civil trials this Court noted:
Experience teaches that just as sure as
human beings are involved, untoward
happenings of various kinds will continue
to occur during trials.
It is the
responsibility of the trial court to rule
upon questions which arise concerning
whether any such occurrence has prevented
a party from having a fair trial; and to
take whatever corrective measure [deemed]
necessary, including the granting of a
mistrial where that is required.
Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121, 124
(1965).

This Court went on to say that the trial court's

decision to deny a motion for mistrial should not be disturbed
unless there was a clear abuse of discretion.
Other states have applied the same standard to
criminal trials.
544 P.2d 38 (1975)

See, e.g.

State v. Kerr, 14 wash. App. 584,

(Granting or denying mistrial founded on

jury misconduct discretionary); State v. Jakeway, 558 P.2d 113
(Kan. 1976)

(no abuse of discretion in denial of mistrial

motion where juror misconduct alleged); Sorce v. State, 497
P.2d 902 (Nev. 1972).

The Sorce court said that a trial court

might grant a mistrial where it reasonably appears that one or
more jurors were biased and would not engage in honest
deliberation.

Where there was nothing to indicate that a

juror's statements had any effect on the deliberations of the
jury, however, refusal to grant a mistrial was not an abuse of

-14-

J1scretion.
i

The

juror in Sorce told other jurors that she

1"1uqht the defense attorneys were concerned because her
,,;l,,1nrl

s1,Jnerl the indictment upon which the defendant was

held for

trial.

The juror was replaced with an alternate and

the appellate court held that because there was no showing of
coercion of the jury or prejudice to the defendant or that the
statement had any effect on jury deliberations, discretion was
n'.lt Abused.

Sorce, 497 P.2d at 904.

In the instant case it does not reasonably appear
that the two jurors allegedly involved were so biased that
they would not engage in honest deliberation.

There is no

evidence indicating that the statement had any effect on the
iury's deliberations.

The juror's alleged comment could be

interpreterl to mean that the jury's services would no longer
be neerled
g0ilty.

if the other defendant also changed his plea to
It did not necessarily mean that the juror assumed

appellant was guilty.

This

is especially true in light of the

jury instructions which required the jury to base its verdict
on the evidence adduced at trial, to weigh the evidence
fairly,

impartially and conscientiously, to decide the case

inrliv1dually after consultation among themselves and not to
0resume guilt based on the charge but to presum 0

innocence

,,,,,ii satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt.

See, Jury

lw,1ruc:t1nns No. 4, 10, 11, 13, 14 (R. 95, 100, 101, 103,
111"'.

lie• ause

there is no evidence that the jury was

['re1url1ced hy the alleged comment,
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it was not an abuse of

discretion to deny appellant's motion for a mistrial.

The

verdict of the jury should, therefore, be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The evidence adduced at trial, though
circumstantial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict was sufficient for the jury to find appellant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, appellant was not

entitled to a mistrial because there is no evidence that the
jury's deliberations were tainted by prejudice nor evidence
that any of the jurors was so biased that they could not
engage in honest deliberations.

For these reasons,

the

judgment of the court below should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

of Ju 1 y, 19 8 4
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